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Abstract
Emission of uniformly dispersed greenhouse gases is construed here as a coopera-
tive production game, featuring side-payments, quota exchange, uncertainty, and
multi-period planning. Stochastic programming offers good instruments to analyze
such games. Absent efficient markets for emissions, such programming may help to
imitate market-like, price-based transfers among concerned parties. Present appro-
priate markets, it may predict equilibrium outcomes. In both cases, shadow values
of aggregate emissions define side-payments or prices that yield core solutions.
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Greenhouse Gases, Cooperation, and Exchange
Sjur Didrik Fl˚am (sjur.flaam@econ.uib.no)
1 Introduction
The possibility of global climate change has been perceived - and partly understood
- for more than two decades. Scientific controversy and uncertainty not withstand-
ing, the evidence supporting that possibility, and associated dire consequences, now
attracts much attention. Above all, global heating, driven mainly by CO2 emissions,
has fostered widespread concern (or greater risk perception) - and thereby induced
many nations to sign the Kyoto treaty.
Regarding such emissions economic theory has, for at least three decades, de-
clared marketable permits (and Pigouvian taxes) superior to conventional regulation
of quantities (or approval of technologies); see [11], [12]. Yet, the largely political de-
bate remains polarized around the two extreme alternatives: command-and-control
versus economic instruments.
Quite generally, economics depends on - and amply demonstrates - theoretical
and practical advantages stemming from exchange of private commodities (goods
or bads). Similarly, insurance and finance thrives on mutual benefits derived from
exchange of private risks or securities. So, why then does advocacy for emission
trade generate, in many corners, moderate enthusiasm or reserved support? There
may be several reasons, including first, absence of efficient market (or market-like
mechanisms/ institutions) to mediate emission trade. Second, even if such markets
were functioning well, the resulting cost-benefit distribution might be perceived
as unfair or lacking in legitimacy. Third, traders of standard variety often face
credit rationing, and they are rarely as foresighted or rational as those commonly
accommodated by economic theory. Fourth, trade can hardly clear the market in one
equilibrated, immediate shot. Transactions rather evolve, step by step, in contingent
manner, and frequently take place out of equilibrium.
Given such features it is a challenge to come up with concepts and procedures
that stand good chances of being understood, accepted, and implemented. The
novelty - and modest object - of this paper is to advocate, for these purposes, the
joint use of cooperative game theory and stochastic programming. Doing so, I
depart from the literature which studies pollution within the frames of competitive
equilibrium [9], [15] or noncooperative games [13], [14].
As is well known, programming - and notably duality theory - may help in
assessing the value of relaxed constraints, i.e. of marginal emissions. Less known
is that it can also single out transfers, accompanied by payments, these serving as
surrogates for reasonable market transactions. In fact, by imitating price-taking
equilibrium not only efficiency is ensured (via the first welfare theorem) but social
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stability as well. To wit, the outcomes considered below belong to the core; they
are such that no party can gain by deviating from a suitably specified, enforceable
treaty. Added to these desirable properties comes one good and one bad: On the
positive side, Pareto efficiency, and stability against deviations, can be produced
and upheld by decentralized barter among honest parties. On the negative side, a
cooperative treaty admittedly appears vulnerable and naive in presuming perfect
compliance.
Ma¨ler [14], who studied an acid rain game with non-uniform precipitation, rightly
doubted the possibility of construing such instances as cooperative games in char-
acteristic form. In that regard he expressed two well founded worries: first, the
characteristic function could be beyond practical reach; second, the external impact
of outsiders on any coalition might be hard to predict. However, when it comes to
uniformly dispersed greenhouse gases the situation changes radically. On the first
account, as shown below, there is no need to generate the characteristic function.
On the second account, since aggregate emission most likely will equal the sum of
permits, the externalities are common and predictable. Such simplification not only
facilitates modelling; it also opens up for use of (multi-stage stochastic) program-
ming - and for decentralized, practical implementation by means of markets.
Arguments, showing this, are organized below as follows. For motivation, Section
2 reconsiders an important linear instance of production games, first studied by
Owen [16], later extended in [22]. Section 3, being the heart of the paper, defines the
transferable-utility cooperative game and shows that core solutions can come handy
in terms of Lagrange multipliers, these supporting equilibrium in a competitive quota
market. Section 4 spells out those insights in a multistage setting, Section 5 includes
uncertainty, and Section 6 synthesizes all this. Finally, Section 7 concludes by briefly
mentioning the prospects for iterative trading, taking place out of equilibrium. Since
this paper mainly is conceptual, I gloss over minor technicalities - and relegate
numerical illustrations to subsequent studies.
2 An Example
The following stylized example, first studied by Owen [16], illustrates some key issues
well: Suppose each agent i, who belongs to a finite society I , faces a linear program
pii(ei) := max
{
〈c, x〉
∣∣ x ≥ 0, ei − Ax ≥ 0} , (1)
assumed feasible with attained finite value. Here and elsewhere 〈·, ·〉 means an inner
product; A is a m × n activity matrix; the vector ei ∈ Rm denotes i’s endowment
of m different emission permits; and c ∈ Rn accounts for monetary contributions
created by activity plans x ∈ Rn+.
Most likely individual emission permits would come in proportions that cause
shortages, excesses, or bottlenecks. Then gains can be had by pooling private en-
dowments. Specifically, coalition S ⊆ I , in controlling endowment eS :=
∑
i∈S e
i,
could achieve an optimal value
piS(eS) := max
{
〈c, x〉
∣∣ x ≥ 0, eS − Ax ≥ 0} (2)
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superior to the individually assembled outcome
∑
i∈S pi
i(ei). So, given advantages in
the aggregate, it is fitting to ask: How can potential gains of cooperation be secured
and split?
For a quick and motivating answer, suppose there is an optimal dual solution (a
Lagrange multiplier) p¯ to problem (2) when S = I. That price vector p¯ evaluates
(marginal) permits for the grand coalition S = I. Therefore, quite naturally, let
i be offered payment ui := 〈p¯, ei〉 for handing his holding over to the cooperative
enterprise - or for bringing his emission quota to an internal market. Will he accept
that offer? Yes, most likely! In fact, as it turns out, since
∑
i∈S u
i ≥ piS(eS) for all
S ⊂ I, and
∑
i∈I u
i = piI(eI), nobody has economic incentive to object.
This story was coached in terms of cooperation. The parties need not sign or
enforce a contract though. Implementation can better, and more easily, come via a
market where emission permits are traded at the equilibrium price vector p¯. More
realistically, trading may develop, and a market could come to function, by iter-
ated bilateral exchanges of quotas. As shown below that market can accommodate
nonlinear preferences/technologies, several stages, and substantial uncertainty. For
simplicity those features are next presented separately.
3 Nonlinear Emission Games
Suppose that each member of a fixed, finite society I owns an emission permit,
clearly codified as a vector residing in a finite-dimensional vector space E. What I
have in mind are quantified ”licences to pollute”, these being privately held rights
to discharge diverse greenhouse gases into the atmosphere. As spelled out later,
elements in E can be construed as processes, incorporating contingent emissions
indexed by time/location and event. The set I could comprise diverse industries
within a region or the signataries of an international treaty.
If i ∈ I contends with his permit ei ∈ E, he obtains payoff pii(ei). Instead of him
going alone, the situation invites coordination or joint undertakings [8]. Specifically,
any coalition S ⊆ I could consider its stand-alone payoff
piS(eS) := sup
{∑
i∈S
pii(qi)
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈S
qi =
∑
i∈S
ei =: eS
}
, (3)
the aim being to distribute proceeds and quotas among the members. It is tacitly
assumed here that no i misrepresents privately held information about pii(·) to own
advantage. Granted such honesty, what we have is a cooperative production game
with player set I , characteristic function I ⊇ S → piS(eS) ∈ R, and potential side-
payments. For this game a payoff allocation u = (ui) ∈ RI belongs to the core iff it
entails
Pareto efficiency:
∑
i∈I u
i = piI(eI),
and social stability:
∑
i∈S u
i ≥ piS(eS) for all coalitions S ⊂ I.
Social stability means that no singleton or set S ⊂ I of several players could improve
their outcome by splitting away from the society. Note that mere stability is easy to
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achieve: Simply let the numbers ui be so large that
∑
i∈S u
i ≥ piS(eS), ∀S ⊂ I. So, to
no surprise, the essential difficulty resides in the requirement that
∑
i∈I u
i = piI(eI).
To regard sharing of quotas within cooperative game theory has the potential
advantage of emphasizing equity issues. Besides, as it turns out, there is a direct
connection to optimization and to exchange markets [23]. Indeed, by means of
programming or a market, an explicit price-determined core allocation can be found
under weak and natural assumptions. To show this let
LS(p, q) :=
∑
i∈S
[
pii(qi) +
〈
p, ei − qi
〉]
denote the standard Lagrangian of problem (3). Any price vector p¯ ∈ E satisfying
piI(eI) ≥ supq L
I(p¯, q) will be named a Lagrange multiplier for the grand coalition.
Clearly, given any constant price regime p ∈ E for permits, not necessarily a La-
grange multiplier, and also given the possibility to purchase any emission quota
qi ∈ E, then agent i could secure himself production profit
pii
∗
(p) := sup
{
pii(qi)−
〈
p, qi
〉 ∣∣ qi ∈ E } .
Added to that profit comes the market value 〈p, ei〉 of his initial endowment. Note
for the subsequent argument that
supq L
S(p, q) =
∑
i∈S {〈p, e
i〉+ pii
∗
(p)} and
infp LS(p, q) =
∑
i∈S pi
i(qi) if
∑
i∈S q
i = eS, −∞ otherwise.
(4)
In these terms a main result can now be stated forthwith:
Theorem 1 (Lagrange multipliers yield core solutions). Suppose p¯ ∈ E is a
Lagrange multiplier for the grand coalition. Then the payoff allocation ui := 〈p¯, ei〉+
pii
∗
(p¯), i ∈ I, belongs to the core.
Proof. Social stability obtains via (4) because any coalition S receives
∑
i∈S u
i =
∑
i∈S
{〈
p¯, ei
〉
+ pii
∗
(p¯)
}
= sup
q
LS(p¯, q) ≥ inf
p
sup
q
LS(p, q) ≥ sup
q
inf
p
LS(p, q) = piS(eS).
The very last inequality is often referred to as weak duality. The hypothesis con-
cerning p¯ ensures strong duality. To wit,
piI(eI) ≥ sup
q
LI(p¯, q) ≥ inf
p
sup
q
LI(p, q) ≥ sup
q
inf
p
LI(p, q) = piI(eI).
So, using
∑
i∈I u
i =
∑
i∈I {〈p¯, e
i〉 + pii
∗
(p¯)} = supq L
I(p¯, q), one sees that Pareto
efficiency also prevails. 2
Theorem 1 has a nice interpretation, already sketched above, and pointing to
implementation: If emission permits were traded at constant unit prices p¯, then i
could envisage a profit 〈p¯, ei〉 + pii
∗
(p¯) composed of sales revenue plus production
profit. Such trading possibilities decentralize production planning and profit con-
siderations. The price p¯ ensures both market clearing and efficiency. This result
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hinges, of course, upon existence of at least one Lagrange multiplier. As is well
known, such existence largely depends on each objective qi → pii(qi) being concave
[17].1
When all pii are differentiable, the marginal profit p¯ is the same across all ac-
tive producers, that is, such an agent i chooses a net emission ei − qi satisfying
p¯ = (pii)′(qi). This feature implicitly confirms the usual justification for marketable
permits: Emission abatement will be undertaken by agents/firms with lowest cost.2
Gersbach and Glazer [5] offer additional justification. They recall that hold-up prob-
lems can produce predictable relief instead of necessary reform, and they show that
governments can overcome such time-inconsistency by issuing tradeable permits.
The cooperative set-up used here does not allow any imperfections in the quota
market: Monopoly or cartels are not admitted. Clearly, this assumption is ques-
tionable, and apparently more so if banking and borrowing allow emissions to the
shifted across time periods [7]. (Thus a regime which treats emission permits as
perishable goods might be more efficient.)
In any case, and as already illustrated in section 2, the function pii(·) is a reduced,
indirect object. It is predicated on agent i exploiting the possibilities to reallocate
resources (say over time, locations, or production lines). So, in particular, a deposit-
refund system could be at work. I stress that pii(·) might stem from a regional or
national model, incorporating various modes of competition, not necessarily perfect.
Emission permits are given data here. How they were acquired is not an issue -
be it by auction, in grandfatherly manner, or via a distribution that reflects some
proportionality constraints [9]. The advantage of being silent about such important
issues here is that many and diverse scenarios fit within unifying frames. Given the
long-term nature of global warming, one may imagine aggregate emission constraints
of increasing severity. Such aggregates would stem from targets for accumulated
1Otherwise there might be a nonnegative duality gap/deficit
d := inf
p
sup
q
LI(p, q)− sup
q
inf
p
LI(p, q)
such that any dual optimal solution p¯ ∈ argmin
[
supq L
I (p, q)
]
, while ensuring social stability,
implies non-sustainable over-spending or budget deficit d =
∑
i∈I u
i − piI(eI).
Thus, for the sake of having d = 0, emissions should yield decreasing returns to scale in every part
of the considered economy. That hypothesis, although pervasive in general equilibrium analysis, is
problematic and far from innocuous.
Also worth notice is the stability of problems like (3) with respect to aggregation/ disaggregation.
Specifically, suppose i stands for a syndicate of agents j ∈ J(i), the sets J(i), i ∈ I, being nonempty
and disjoint. Then
piI(eI ) := sup


∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J(i)
piij(qij)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈I,j∈J(i)
qij =
∑
i∈I,j∈J(i)
eij = eI

 .
2As a technical note, suppose piI(eI) is attained, this meaning that piI (eI) =
∑
i∈I pi
i(qi) with
eI =
∑
i∈I
qi. Provided all pii(·) are concave, two things hold in that case: first, if some function
pii is strictly concave, then the corresponding component qi becomes unique; second, if all pii are
continuous at qi, except maybe one, then piI becomes continuous whence superdifferentiable at eI .
Granted concave payoffs, it is easy to see that p¯ is a multiplier for the grand coalition iff it is a
supergradient of piI(·) at eI ; see [17]. One may reasonably assume that each function qi → pii(qi)
be increasing, whence any Lagrange multiplier (or price) p¯ must quite naturally be nonnegative.
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carbon content in the atmosphere.
I also set aside emission taxes. These could be levied and included as endogenous
parts of the payoff functions. Doing so can generate ”double dividend” if taxes
on unabated emissions are recycled as marginal cuts in taxes on other production
factors, notably labor and capital [15]. Admittedly, the setting of appropriate tax
rates is difficult since they induce technological change and affect progress that stems
from learning-by-doing [6]. The present analysis abstracts from several, potentially
significant considerations, such as capital accumulation, technological innovation,
and ”green mobility” [1]. Such considerations could, however, fit the approach
outlined in Section 6.
4 Emissions over Time
Let now T be a time horizon, assumed finite for simplicity. Correspondingly, let
E = E1 × · · · × ET be a product of Euclidean spaces so that any emission permit
e ∈ E has components e1, . . . , eT , specified from the first period up to the last
included. Sometimes one may posit that individual payoff is time separable, i.e.
pii(ei) =
∑
t pi
i
t(e
i
t) for suitable single-period functions pi
i
t(·). Then the results of
Section 3 decompose across time. Specifically, let p¯t be a Lagrange multiplier that
applies to the aggregate emission constraint at time t. If each i receives the (present
value) payoff uit := 〈p¯t, e
i
t〉+ pi
i
t∗(p¯t) for his time t contribution, then that allocation
belongs to the core of the game prevailing at that moment. Moreover, the numbers
ui :=
∑T
t=1 u
i
t, i ∈ I, constitute an overall core allocation.
Admittedly, for large T, in letting the model focus on long-lived agents, concerns
about intergenerational equity are likely to become more pronounced. Such concerns
are not addressed here [21]. Also, if the far-distant, uncertain future is discounted,
there are good reasons for using a most moderate interest rate [24].
5 Contingent Emissions
Suppose uncertainty is modelled by means of a finite probability space (Ω, P ), com-
monly agreed upon by everybody. In our context this means that state ω ∈ Ω
happens with positive probability P (ω). We posit that each agent i holds a state
contingent emission permit ω → ei(ω). Suppose also that his payoff function is
separable across events, i.e. his preferences are of the von Neumann-Morgenstern
expected payoff variety:
pii(ei) =
∑
pii(ω, ei(ω))P (ω).
Then again there will be decomposition. Indeed, let p¯(ω) be the Lagrange multiplier
that applies in state ω. If and when that state is realized, agent i receives a payoff
ui(ω) := 〈p¯(ω), ei(ω)〉+pii
∗
(ω, p¯(ω)) which forms his part of a contingent core solution.
The expected overall gain to him ui :=
∑
ω u
i(ω)P (ω) makes up what he gets in the
overall core allocation.
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6 Synthesis: Multi-stage Stochastic Programming
This section brings things together (and can be skipped). Consider planning over
time t = 1, . . . , T < ∞ - under imperfect knowledge about the state ω ∈ Ω of the
world. Although ω cannot be fully identified a priori, its probability distribution P
is supposed commonly known, given exogenously, and defined on some sigma-field
FT+1 over the finite set Ω.
Identification of ω improves over time. Specifically, there is an expanding family
F1 ⊆ . . . ⊆ FT ⊆ FT+1 of sigma-fields - or an unfolding scenario tree - which
describes the information flow. At time t one may ascertain for any event in Ft -
and such events only - whether it has happened or not. Since Ω is assumed finite,
Ft will partition Ω into minimal events (atoms, information sets, decision nodes).
The inclusion Ft ⊆ Ft+1, t ≤ T, reflecting progressive acquisition of knowledge, says
that the said partition becomes finer as time evolves; see [4].
Agent i seeks to maximize a monetary contribution ci(xi) = ci(xi(·)) to him-
self over suitable trajectories xi = (xi1(·), . . . , x
i
T (·)) of random vectors x
i
t(ω) ∈ R
ni
t.
These vectors represent constrained choices made sequentially. At time t he imple-
ments the part xit of his overall plan. That part is supposed to be a Ft-measurable
strategy (policy, behavioral rule) xit : Ω → R
ni
t. Besides this insistence on mea-
surability (nonanticipativity or adaptedness), there are other restrictions, one being
that
xit(ω) ∈ X
i
t(ω) almost surely for each t. (5)
Here ω ; Xit(ω) ⊆ R
ni
t is a nonempty closed Ft-measurable random set. (For
notational simplicity all inclusions, equalities, and inequalities that involve random
objects are henceforth tacitly understood to hold almost surely and componentwise).
Added to set-constraint (5) comes a family of explicit, functional constraints:
eit(ω)− A
i
t(ω, x
i
1(ω), . . . , x
i
t(ω)) ∈ R
mt
+ for all t, (6)
this inclusion featuring an emission permit eit(ω) and a vector-valued function A
i
t,
both Ft-measurable. Note that the basic decision spaces Rn
i
t can vary across agents
(and time), but, most important, the emission permits eit and functions A
i
t, i ∈ I,
that come into effect at time t, all have the same image space Rmt.
Write xi ∈ Xi and ei−Ai(xi) ≥ 0 for short to indicate satisfaction of (5) and (6),
respectively. Agent i’s planning under uncertainty can now be formalized succinctly
as problem
pii(ei) := sup
{
ci(xi)
∣∣ xi ∈ Xi and ei − Ai(xi) ≥ 0} ,
much like (1). In this setting coalition S ⊆ I could achieve stand-alone payoff
piS(eS) = sup
{∑
i∈S
ci(xi)
∣∣∣∣∣ xi ∈ Xi, ∀i ∈ S, and
∑
i∈S
[
ei − Ai(xi)
]
≥ 0
}
= sup
{∑
i∈S
pii(qi)
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i∈S
qi = eS
}
.
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Whether that optimal value is computed or not, once again it is tacitly assumed,
somewhat heroically, that no agent i misrepresents privately held information to
own advantage. On the emission space
E := {e = [et(ω)] | et(ω) ∈ R
mt, t = 1, . . . , T, ω ∈ Ω}
it is now natural to use the statistically motivated inner product 〈p, q〉 :=
∑
t
∑
ω pt(ω)·
qt(ω)P (ω). For simplicity suppose that payoff is separable across time and events,
i.e. ci(xi) =
∑
ω
∑
t c
i
t(ω, x
i(ω))P (ω). Let
[
xi1, . . . , x
i
t−1
]
=: xi[1,t−1] denote decisions
which i has already made before time t. Given a Ft-measurable Lagrangian price
p¯t(ω), write
uit(ω
∣∣∣Ft−1, xi[1,t−1] ) :=
E
[
sup {p¯t(ω) · (eit(ω)−A
i
t(ω, x
i
1, . . . , x
i
t)) + c
i
t(ω, x
i
t) | x
i
t ∈ X
i
t (ω)}
∣∣∣Ft−1, xi[1,t−1]]
for the conditional expected (present) value of core payoff to agent i at time t.
Theorem 2 (Core solutions in multi-stage, stochastic emission games). Suppose
(t, ω) → p¯t(ω) ∈ R
mt
+ are Lagrange multipliers for the grand coalition. Then p¯t
may be taken Ft-measurable, and by giving ui := 〈p¯, ei〉 + pii∗(p¯) to i we get a core
allocation. That allocation is re-negotiation proof in the following sense: If at some
interim time τ < T , the ”agreed upon” decisions xi[1,τ ] are already made, then the
contingent payoff ∑
t>τ
E
[
uit(ω
∣∣Ft−1, xi[1,t−1] ) ∣∣ Fτ , x[1,τ ] )]
belongs to the core of the cooperative games which ensues from there onwards. In
particular, when Ait(ω, x
i
1, . . . , x
i
t) = A
i
t(ω, x
i
t),
ui =
∑
t
∑
ω
P (ω) sup
{
p¯t(ω) ·
[
eit(ω)− A
i
t(ω, x
i
t)
]
+ cit(ω, x
i
t)
∣∣ xit ∈ Xit(ω)} . 2
[4] gives conditions ensuring existence of a Lagrange multiplier. For diverse sorts
of relevant uncertainty, and their relative impact, see [19]. The opening up of this
vista on stochastic programming invites use of computational approaches that use
decomposition akin to what is effectuated by markets; see e.g. [18], [20]
7 Iterative Trading
The game introduced above reduces, in essence, to a widespread market in date-
event goods, or so-called contingent commodities. More precisely, it fits within
the frames of competitive equilibrium. That branch of economics, while presuming
price-taking behavior, has failed to account for price formation, transactions out of
equilibrium, and the role of money as medium of exchange.
The simplicity of our setting invites reconsideration of these issues. Since the
emission market features constant supply - and since income effects are negligible
or ignored - there should be good prospects for reaching a stable equilibrium over
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time. Indeed, Ermoliev et al. [2], [3] explore the convergence of repeated, bilateral
exchange towards an efficient steady state. Their procedure, over stages k = 0, 1, ...,
could be adapted to the present context broadly as follows:
• At the current stage k, pick randomly (or in cyclical manner) two agents i, j,
these then having emissions qi and qj, respectively.
• Consider the difference d := ∇pii(qi) −∇pij(qj) between their marginal profit
vectors (gradients) ∇pii(qi) and ∇pij(qj).
• If d = 0, or at least to a good approximation, then select anew two random
agents.
• Otherwise, if necessary, scale d appropriately down so that the updated quotas
qi← qi + d/(k + 1) and qj ← qj − d/(k + 1)
given respectively to i and j, both become non-negative.
• Increase k by 1 and continue to pick pairs of agents until convergence.
The stability analysis of such procedures is left for subsequent studies. Suffice it
to emphasize here the following features: Trade is voluntary and driven by perceived
prospects for mutual improvements. It happens out of equilibrium and uses money
as medium of exchange. It requires no revealing of private information. While still
away from equilibrium, the price - and the associated monetary compensation -
that goes along with a bilateral quota could result from bargaining and would not
easily be predicted. It depends on the divergence - as encapsulated in d - between
willingness to accept and willingness to pay [10].
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